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I. HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION 
Lawrence Tate was riding his bicycle home from work when a 
car ran a stop sign and struck him.  Mr. Tate retained an attorney, 
James Olsen, to bring a personal injury claim against the driver of 
the car for injuries suffered in the accident.  But because the 
attorney failed to file the lawsuit in a timely manner, the claim 
against the driver was forever barred by the statute of limitations. 
Instead, Mr. Tate hired another attorney and filed a 
malpractice claim against Mr. Olsen.  Unfortunately, shortly after 
filing the malpractice claim against Mr. Olsen, Mr. Tate died in a 
plane crash while returning from a business trip. 
Under Minnesota law, two legal claims survive Mr. Tate’s 
death: (1) a claim which can be filed against the airline for his 
death in the crash under Minnesota’s so-called “wrongful death 
statute,” and (2) the malpractice claim against Mr. Olsen.1 
Because Mr. Tate died in the plane crash, a claim is allowed to 
proceed under the wrongful death statute. Actions brought under 
the wrongful death statute are guided through each step of the 
adjudicative process because Minnesota has a rule that establishes 
the procedure for the continuance of wrongful death claims.2  The 
wrongful death claim will have a much simpler path to follow to 
resolution than the malpractice action, for the personal 
 
 1. See infra Part II.A for a discussion on why Mr. Tate’s original claim against 
the driver for injuries suffered in the bicycle accident would not survive his death. 
 2. See infra Part V.A. 
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representative appointed on behalf of Mr. Tate, for any attorneys, 
and for the court involved in the case. 
Pursuant to both statutory and common law in Minnesota, the 
malpractice claim will “survive” the death of the claimant.3  But in 
contrast to claims filed under the wrongful death statute, there is 
no rule governing the procedure for pursuing actions that 
continue under the “survival statute.”  Consequently, there is much 
confusion for the parties and court officials involved with Mr. 
Tate’s malpractice action. 
Several things may cause confusion in a survival action.  For 
example, it is possible that only the attorney will know of a pending 
action at the death of his client.  If this is the case, how does the 
probate court learn of the action?  How, and from whom, does an 
attorney receive compensation for handling a survival action?  Who 
notifies the district court of the death of a party?  How does the 
district court in which the action is pending learn of the 
appointment of a personal representative?  Professional 
responsibility rules require an attorney to diligently handle a 
matter to its conclusion.4  An attorney is also required to 
communicate regarding issues to be decided by the client, 
including evaluation of settlement offers. 5  How can an attorney 
comply with rules and procedures if she is not sure who the client is 
after the client has died but before a personal representative is 
appointed?  Who is authorized to accept a settlement on behalf of 
the decedent?  These are but a few of the questions that arise when 
a party dies before the completion of an action but the action still 
survives under Minnesota law.  These issues could be resolved with 
the enactment of a procedure to be followed by parties, attorneys, 
and court officials when a party dies before the action being 
resolved. 
To avoid the issues shown above, Minnesota would benefit 
from the adoption of a clear procedure for the continuance of a 
cause of action which falls under Minnesota’s survival statute 
similar to the rule governing an action brought under the wrongful 
death statute.6 
 
 3. See MINN. STAT. § 573.01 (2006).  See also Johnson v. Taylor, 435 N.W.2d 
127 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). 
 4. See MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2005). 
 5. See id. R. 1.4 (2005). 
 6. In order to clarify which actions are being discussed, this Note will use the 
term “wrongful death action” for actions filed after the death of the injured 
person that are based on the cause of the death as filed under Minnesota Statutes 
3
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This Note uses the procedure governing wrongful death 
actions to demonstrate how legal practitioners would benefit from 
a similar procedure governing survival actions.  This Note first 
explores the history of the substantive law pertaining to personal 
injury litigation, including wrongful death actions, to demonstrate 
the divergent paths to be taken procedurally for the two possible 
causes of action brought on behalf of Mr. Tate.7  It then explains 
how the law evolved from a complete bar on actions brought on 
behalf of another person to statutorily allowing them to continue 
in certain prescribed circumstances.8 
Part III addresses how Minnesota’s survival statute has evolved 
since its original enactment when Minnesota was still a territory to 
its current form.9  The discussion on Minnesota’s survival statute 
uses an actual case to show the confusion surrounding jurisdiction 
over a survival action. 
Part IV defines the probate court’s role in a survival action and 
compares the jurisdictional issues between the probate court and 
district court in handling a present action after a party dies without 
complete adjudication of the matter.  Parts V and VI analyze the 
jurisdictional issues.10  Finally, Part VII offers a solution to the 
jurisdictional conflict between the probate and district court 
discussed in Part IV and an explanation why such a solution would 
be beneficial to practitioners in Minnesota and the rest of the 
country.11 
 
section 573.02 (also referred to as the “wrongful death statute”).  The Note will 
use the term “survival action” for actions that survive the death of the party but are 
unrelated to the cause of death of the party as filed under Minnesota Statutes 
section 573.01 (also referred to as the “survival statute”) (originally drafted as REV. 
STAT. MINN., ch. 78, § 3 (1851)). 
 7. See infra Part II. 
 8. See infra Part II.C. 
 9. See infra Part III.  While the survival statute allows an action to survive the 
death of either the plaintiff or the defendant, this Note is mostly concerned with 
actions surviving the death of a plaintiff.  Part V.B briefly addresses the procedural 
issues surrounding the continuation of a claim in which a defendant dies during 
the action. 
 10. See infra Parts V, VI. 
 11. See infra Part VII. 
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II. SUBSTANTIVE LAW RELATED TO PERSONAL INJURY LAW 
A. Historical Bar to Actions Resulting in Personal Injury or Death Is 
Gradually Reversed 
1. An Action Is Personal to the Claimant 
In order to understand how actions survive the death of a party 
and to provide a framework in which to analyze a possible 
procedure for such actions, it is necessary to understand how the 
law and public policy surrounding the abatement, survival, or 
transfer of an action evolved.  Historically, an action for death or 
injury was seen as a personal issue, barring it from the possibility of 
pursuit by anyone other than the injured (or deceased).12  The law 
gradually recognized actions as separate from the person and 
allowed them to proceed on behalf of the deceased’s survivors.  
Fears that allowing someone other than an original party to the 
action to continue pursuing it would lead to rampant corruption 
began to abate.  As a result, courts began allowing actions to be 
assigned to another party who could then pursue the action.13  
Legislatures passed statutes allowing actions to be pursued after the 
death of the party, even when the death was unrelated to the 
proceeding, by a representative on behalf of the deceased’s estate.14 
2. Wrongful Death Actions 
Before the nineteenth century, Mr. Tate’s hypothetical action 
against the airline would have been barred because the law did not 
recognize the right to sue for wrongful death.15 
In early Anglo-Saxon law, homicide—intentional or not—was 
considered a civil offense for which the wrongdoer was required to 
pay the kinsmen of the decedent.16  In the thirteenth century, a 
change in social attitudes led to homicide being viewed as a crime 
 
 12. See infra Part II.A. 
 13. See infra Part II.C. 
 14. See infra Part II.E. 
 15. Of course, an even better reason why Mr. Tate’s action against the airline 
would not have been sustainable before the nineteenth century is that the Wright 
brothers’ famous Kitty Hawk flight did not occur until 1903, making it impossible 
for Mr. Tate to even be on a plane before the twentieth century. 
 16. 1 STUART SPEISER & JAMES E. ROOKS, JR., RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH   
§ 1:3 (4th ed. 2005). 
5
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against the state.17  As a result, private actions by the survivors were 
barred.18 
Although personal injury lawsuits began to emerge in the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, even as late as the early 
eighteenth century personal injury litigation was still uncommon.19  
In cases of domestic injury, the common law only recognized 
wrongs done to “the superior of the parties related.”20 
In the early nineteenth century, economic life changed as 
industrialization led to a separation of work and domestic life.21  A 
new type of personal injury lawsuit began to emerge, which did not 
involve a master or his loss of services in a servant.22  Lawsuits 
allowed a laborer incapacitated by injury the possible means to 
maintain an income to support his household with an income that 
was now separate from his employment.23 
But an off-hand remark indicating that wrongful death claims 
were not actionable made by Lord Ellenborough in the 1808 
English case of Baker v. Bolton24 put an end to such lawsuits and 
 
 17. Id. (citing Gustavus Hay, Jr., Death as a Civil Cause of Action in 
Massachusetts, 7 HARV. L. REV.  170, 170–71 (1893)). 
 18. Id.  Because a person’s property was forfeited, it was pointless to sue for a 
civil remedy as there was no way to satisfy a civil judgment.  Id. (citing T. A. 
Smedley, Wrongful Death—Bases of the Common Law Rules, 13 VAND. L. REV. 605, 611 
(1960)). 
 19. See John Fabian Witt, From Loss of Services to Loss of Support: The Wrongful 
Death Statutes, the Origins of Modern Tort Law, and the Making of the Nineteenth-Century 
Family, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 717, 722 (2000).  The Black Death of the 1340s led 
to severe labor shortages in England causing Parliament and courts to develop 
ways to protect masters’ rights to the services of their servants.  Id. at 723.  The 
result was allowing a master to seek recovery, in a trespass action, against third 
parties who intentionally injured his servant when the injury resulted in the master 
losing the services of the injured servant.  Id. 
 20. Id. at 724.  In early English law, every man had a “property” right “in the 
service of his domestics” so that he could bring an action to recover damages for 
the loss of such services.  Id. (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES 
*429).  On the other hand, “the loss of the inferior by such injuries” was 
unrewarded.  Id. (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *142-43).  Thus, 
actions against heads of household were barred.  Id. at 726. 
 21. Id. at 727.  Before the nineteenth century, the central mode of economic 
life was the household structure, which consisted of the master (head of 
household), wife, servants, and children such that work, leisure, and domestic life 
were all “acted out” in the same place and by the same participants.  Id. at 725.  
This left little room for litigation over personal injuries within a household.  Id. at 
726. 
 22. Id. at 730. 
 23. Id. at 731. 
 24. (1808), 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033. 
6
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eventually led to a complete bar on wrongful death actions.25 Lord 
Ellenborough’s remark in Baker has been cited in hundreds of 
decisions in the United States courts when referring to wrongful 
death actions26 and is still mentioned by our highest courts.27 
Early American courts allowed wrongful death actions before 
the Baker case.28  Some jurisdictions in the United States ignored 
Baker,29 while others followed the English ruling.30  This split among 
jurisdictions created a large amount of litigation in the United 
States.31  The divide, coupled with a marked increase in accidents 
due to the burgeoning industrial economy, forced states to review 
their policies on wrongful death actions.32  Massachusetts enacted 
 
 25. Id. (noting that in an action for the death of a man’s wife in a stage coach 
accident, when applying the felony-merger doctrine “[i]n a civil court, the death 
of a human being could not be complained of as an injury”). 
 26. SPEISER & ROOKS, supra note 16, § 1:2.  See also Mobile Life Ins. Co. v. 
Brame, 95 U.S. 754, 757 (1877) (holding that the life insurance company was not 
able to recover from the defendant, even though the defendant was responsible 
for the insured’s death). 
 27. SPEISER & ROOKS, supra note 16, § 1:2.  See also Smith v. Whitaker, 734 A.2d 
243, 248 (N.J. 1999) (stating that the principle that no civil remedy was available at 
common law for a personal injury resulting in death is traceable to Baker). 
 28. See Witt, supra note 19, at 731–33.  See also Cross v. Guthery, 2 Root 90, 
1794 WL 198, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1794) (allowing husband to recover 
damages when surgeon operated unskillfully on his wife, causing her death). 
 29. See, e.g., LaFage v. Jani, 766 A.2d 1066, 1076 (N.J. 2001) (stating that New 
Jersey recognized common-law wrongful death action before passing its statute in 
1848); Shields v. Yonge, 1854 WL 1606, at *6 (Ga. 1854) (allowing a father to sue 
for damages after the death of his minor son). 
 30. See, e.g., Eden v. Lexington & Frankfort R.R., 53 Ky. 204 (1853) 
(explaining that, although Connecticut and New Hampshire enacted statutes to 
allow for actions in wrongful death, nothing in Kentucky had changed the 
common-law rule that a “cause of action for injuries to the person dies with the 
person injured,” so an action brought by a widow against a railroad for the loss of 
her husband was barred); Carey v. Berkshire R.R., 55 Mass. 475, 478 (1848) 
(holding that, according to the decision set forth in Baker, an action brought by a 
widow against a railroad corporation to recover damages for the loss of her 
husband due to the careless actions of the railroad could not be maintained). 
 31. See Witt, supra note 19, at 733.  See also Plummer v. Webb, 19 F. Cas. 894, 
896 (D. Me. 1825) (holding that a party with an interest in the services of one who 
is injured may sue for compensation so long as he can prove either “actual 
damage” or that allowing such action is the intent of the law); Shields, 1854 WL 
1606, at *5 (ruling common-law actions for wrongful death allowed so long as they 
do not involve felony homicide). 
 32. See Witt, supra note 19, at 733.  See also Needham v. Grand Trunk Ry., 38 
Vt. 294 (1865) (explaining that Vermont passed a wrongful death statute in 1849 
in response to the numerous deaths resulting from wrongful acts committed and 
suffered, which cost the survivor the loss of the “natural support and protection” 
of the deceased, and for which the common law failed to provide a remedy to any 
survivors). 
7
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the first wrongful death statute in the United States that inverted 
the previous model of common-law personal injury litigation, no 
longer limiting actions to compensation for heads of household, 
but allowing recovery to support widows and minor children 
dependent on the laborers’ wages.33  Other states followed 
Massachusetts and enacted wrongful death statutes,34 recognizing a 
new model of family and leading to protections for the family unit 
organized around male wage earners.35  These statutes typically 
provided for the recovery of damages in cases of death “caused by 
wrongful act, neglect, or default, and the act, neglect, or default is 
such as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the party 
injured to maintain an action” and recover damages.36  By 1869, 
twenty-nine of thirty-seven states had enacted wrongful death 
statutes37 and today all fifty states have enacted statutes allowing 
wrongful death actions.38  The majority of these statutes allow an 
 
 33. 1840 MASS. ACTS 224.  The Massachusetts Act stated that if the negligence 
of a common carrier led to the death of a passenger, the carrier would be held 
liable and fined accordingly.  See also Witt, supra note 19, at 733–34. 
 34. See Witt, supra note 19, at 734–35.  The newly enacted American wrongful 
death statutes were modeled on the private tort model of the Lord Campbell’s Act 
enacted by English Parliament.  Id.  Lord Campbell’s Act overturned the common-
law rule set forth in Baker which barred liability in tort for killing another.  Id. 
 35. Id. at 720.  Wrongful death statutes were based increasingly on the family 
paradigm in which husband worked and wife was separated from the market and 
relegated to domestic roles.  Id.  A wife could bring an action for the wrongful 
death of her husband, but no such remedy was available to a husband.  Id.  For a 
discussion on the unequal treatment of gender in tort law, see generally Witt, 
supra note 19 (analyzing the change in tort law as household structures and values 
changed and concluding that tort law has played a substantial role in defining 
gender and family roles); see also Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep 
Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 463 (1998) (arguing that tort law devalues 
or undervalues the lives, activities, and contributions from women and people of 
color).  For a discussion on the evolution of loss of consortium claims brought by 
the surviving partner in a same-sex relationship, see John G. Culhane, A “Clanging 
Silence”: Same-Sex Couples and Tort Law, 89 KY. L.J. 911 (2001) (stating that because 
courts are reluctant to recognize that same-sex couples have intimate 
relationships, courts fail to recognize a right to recover for a loss of that intimacy).  
For an analysis of the changes, both at common law and legislatively, to wrongful 
death laws related to causes of action filed by same-sex partners, see John G. 
Culhane, Even More Wrongful Death: Statutes Divorced from Reality, 32 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 171, 177–80 (2005) (discussing a recent California case in which a lesbian 
woman was granted standing to bring a wrongful death lawsuit on behalf of her 
deceased partner, which prompted California’s legislature to amend its wrongful 
death statute to allow actions brought by a surviving same-sex partner). 
 36. See Witt, supra note 19, at 734. 
 37. Id. at 736. 
 38. SPEISER & ROOKS, supra note 16, § 1:11 (stating “[a]t the present time 
there are statutes in all American states that create a right to recover for wrongful 
8
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action to be filed to recover damages so as to compensate the “next 
of kin” for the loss of the decedent.39 
B. Minnesota’s Wrongful Death Statute 
Minnesota’s wrongful death statute was enacted when 
Minnesota was still a territory.40  It authorized the decedent’s 
personal representative to seek recovery for the exclusive benefit of 
the widow and next of kin and distribute it in proportion to the rest 
of the decedent’s property.41 
In early wrongful death actions, the sole purpose of recovery 
was compensation of the surviving beneficiaries for pecuniary 
losses.42  Therefore, an action was not maintainable if there was no 
surviving spouse or next of kin of decedent.43  The Minnesota 
Supreme Court overturned this rule in Johnson v. Consolidated 
Freightways, Inc. when it held that a trustee may recover on behalf of 
the beneficiary’s estate.44  Later amendments provided 
maintenance of the action by a court-appointed trustee with 
distribution of damages proportionate to the pecuniary loss 
severally suffered by the death.45  Minnesota’s current wrongful 
death statute reads: “[w]hen death is caused by the wrongful act or 
omission of any person or corporation, the trustee appointed . . . 
may maintain an action therefor if the decedent might have 
maintained an action, had the decedent lived, for an injury caused 
by the wrongful act or omission.”46 
The current statute would permit Mr. Tate’s wrongful death 
action (described in the introduction to this Note) to proceed 
against the airline with the appointment of a trustee to pursue the 
interests of Mr. Tate’s beneficiaries as specified in Minnesota’s 
 
death”). 
 39. See Witt, supra note 19, at 736. 
 40. REV. STAT. TERR. MINN., ch. 78, § 3 (1851) ( “When the death of one is 
caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, the personal representatives of 
the former, may maintain an action against the latter, if the former might have 
maintained an action, had he lived, against the latter, for an injury caused by the 
same act or omission . . . .”). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Johnson v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 420 N.W.2d 608, 611 (Minn. 1988). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 613 (stating that damages are limited to the pecuniary losses based 
on the time between the injury to the victim and his death). 
 45. 1905 MINN. REV. LAWS, ch. 87, § 2. 
 46. MINN. STAT. § 573.02, subdiv. 1 (2006) (emphasis added). 
9
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wrongful death statute.47 
C. Historical Analysis of Assignability 
Mr. Tate’s action for malpractice would not have survived in 
the courts before the mid-nineteenth century, because there was a 
complete bar on assigning or transferring causes of action between 
parties.48  The evolution of assignability of claims shows the shift in 
legal thinking regarding the existence of a claim independent from 
the claimant. 
  1. The English Legal System: Prohibitions on Personal Actions 
Claims that had to be asserted by action in the early courts, 
termed “choses in action,” included rights to debts, contract 
damages, rights arising from torts, and rights in personal 
property.49  Because they involved personal rights, it followed 
logically that these personal actions could not be assigned to 
another person.50 
And in fact, due to abuses of the court system, assignment of 
personal claims even came to be banned outright.  In the medieval 
English courts, because of the inability of the courts to self-regulate, 
bribery of both judges and juries led to widespread corruption.51  It 
was consequently possible for litigants from aristocratic families to 
carry out their feuds with other aristocracy through the courts, 
attempting to consolidate larger estates.52  By assisting others in 
suits for recovery of land, they could take an interest in the land in 
 
 47. Id.  Upon written petition by the surviving spouse or next of kin, the court 
having jurisdiction over the action appoints a trustee to commence or continue 
the action and obtain recovery of damages.  Id. § 573.02, subdiv. 3.  The full 
procedure governing a wrongful death action is described infra Part V.A. 
 48. See Kevin Pennell, On the Assignment of Legal Malpractice Claims: A 
Contractual Solution to a Contractual Problem, 82 TEX. L. REV. 481, 483 (2003) 
(explaining that a chose in action is a right to receive debts or damages, and rights 
were considered personal and non-transferable to others). 
 49. W.S. Holdsworth, The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the 
Common Law, 33 HARV. L. REV. 997, 997–98 (1920) (detailing the history of the 
treatment of choses in action by the common law). 
 50. Id. at 1016.  An assignment is “[t]he transfer of rights or property.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 128 (8th ed. 2004). 
 51. See Patrick T. Morgan, Unbundling Our Tort Rights: Assignability for Personal 
Injury and Wrongful Death Claims, 66 MO. L. REV. 683, 691 (2001) (illuminating the 
multitude of problems with the complex and corrupt medieval courts). 
 52. Id. 
10
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return.53  The practice of holding such land interests was known as 
champerty.54  Another practice, maintenance, allowed feudal lords 
to support and uphold their tenants’ lawsuits, clogging the courts 
as a means to carry on their disputes with other lords.55 
Besides overwhelming the courts, the use of maintenance and 
champtery in assisting with litigation became disfavored as un-
Christian.56  Legislation and common law responded with 
prohibitions of these practices, attempting to relieve the overused 
judicial system.57 And the law came to forbid in general the 
assignment of so-called “personal actions,” thus allowing the 
judiciary to rid itself of the corruption that had become associated 
with these actions through maintenance and champtery.58 
2. History of Assignments in the United States: From Complete Bar to 
Dependence on Type of Cause of Action 
The prohibitions on champerty and maintenance gained a 
different use in American law as a means to protect important 
sources of economic growth—such as railroads—by barring claims 
from those who could ill-afford to withstand the cost of litigation.59  
Early English common law stated that “no man could purchase 
another’s right to a suit, either in whole or in part.”60  American 
courts followed England and based their decisions disallowing 
assignments on the public policy concern that courts should not be 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id.  The modern definition of champerty is “[a]n agreement between an 
officious intermeddler in a lawsuit and a litigant by which the intermeddler helps 
pursue the litigant's claim as consideration for receiving part of any judgment 
proceeds.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 246 (8th ed. 2004). 
 55. See Morgan, supra note 51, at 692.  The modern definition of 
maintenance refers to “[a]ssistance in prosecuting or defending a lawsuit given to 
a litigant by someone who has no bona fide interest in the case; meddling in 
someone else's litigation."  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 973 (8th ed. 2004). 
 56. See Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CAL. L. REV. 48, 58 (1935) 
(explaining that a litigious spirit did not coincide with the Christian spirit of 
charity).  Use of the judicial system to protect one’s rights was acceptable, but use 
of those same courts in order to intervene in litigation on another’s behalf was 
deemed meddling.  Id. 
 57. See 7 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 523–24 
(Methuen & Co. Ltd.  & Sweet & Maxwell Ltd. 1937) (1925) (stating that most 
statutes have consolidated champerty and maintenance). 
 58. See Morgan, supra note 51, at 693. 
 59. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE 
UNITED STATES 6–10 (3d ed. 1999).  See also Radin, supra note 56, at 65–66. 
 60. Lytle v. State, 17 Ark. 608, 627 (1857). 
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used to enforce any action that hinted at maintenance and 
champerty.61  Many courts believed that this prohibition spared 
individuals who suffered a personal tragedy the intrusion of others 
seeking to purchase their tort claim.62 
3. The Policy Changes: What Type of Claim Is It? 
In the early twentieth century, maintenance gradually ceased 
to be a reason to object to the assignment of an action and the 
complete bar on assignments increasingly became reversed.63  
Advancing conditions of commercial interests and a burgeoning 
economy led the judiciary and legislatures to modify the flat 
prohibition on assignments.64  Courts also stated that the original 
laws barring champerty and maintenance were intended to prevent 
the interference of strangers in an action, but that those who agree 
to aid a party to an action should not be regarded as committing 
unlawful maintenance.65 
 
 61. See Morgan, supra note 51, at 695.  American courts still use the so-called 
dangers of champerty and maintenance as justifications to prevent assignments. 
See also Travelers Indem. Co. v. Vaccari, 310 Minn. 97, 100–01, 245 N.W.2d 844, 
846 (1976) (stating that subrogation does not create the same risk of champerty 
and maintenance as does assignment). 
 62. See Peck v. Heurich, 167 U.S. 624, 630 (1897) (explaining that if 
assignment was permitted, the judiciary would soon be overcome with “baseless 
litigation” and lead to lawyers who speculate, and hence gamble, on the outcome 
of a suit).  See also Huber v. Johnson, 68 Minn. 74, 77–79, 70 N.W. 806, 807–08 
(1897) (stating that prohibition against champerty and maintenance was to 
“prevent officious intermeddlers from stirring up strife . . . or speculative litigation 
which would . . . lead to corrupt practices and pervert the remedial process of the 
law”).  This fear of corruption or perversion of the process of law can still be seen 
in laws regulating the solicitation of clients.  See MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
R. 7.3 (2005).  In addition, “ambulance chaser” generally is a derogatory term for 
one who solicits cases for an attorney in return for a percentage of the recovery.  
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 88 (8th ed. 2004). 
 63. Bouvier v. Baltimore & N.Y. Ry. Co., 51 A. 781, 785 (N.J. 1902) (stating 
that maintenance was “entirely the creature of English statutory law, and of the 
judicial construction of such law, and . . . there existed no rational ground for the 
contention that any part of the law of maintenance in any form remained in 
force”). 
 64. Hillsdale Distillery Co. v. Briant, 129 Minn. 223, 226, 152 N.W. 265, 266 
(1915).  Courts have stated that experience has shown that no evil results from the 
assignment of rights of action but, in fact, the public good is greatly promoted by 
the free circulation of property in action, as well as of property in possession. See 
Thallhimer v. Brinckerhoff, 3 Cow. 623 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824). 
 65. Thallhimer, 3 Cow. at 623 (holding that an agreement between the 
plaintiff and a third party with regard to the action was not void within the 
provisions of the act prohibiting champerty and maintenance and should be 
upheld). 
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Most states modified the common-law rule to allow actions that 
survive the death of the holder to be assigned.66  The apprehension 
that “justice would be trodden down” if an action was transferred 
was no longer considered valid.67  The evolution of society reached 
a point that the harms associated with champerty and maintenance 
were effectively controlled by other measures.68  American courts 
began to recognize that the evils of assigning a claim were no 
longer relevant and started allowing assignment.69 
D. Minnesota’s Stance on Assignment 
Minnesota allows assignment of an action if the action meets 
the statutory survival test.70  The relationship between the 
survivability of a claim and its assignability appears to stem from 
dictum in the case of Comegys v. Vasse.71  In Comegys, the United 
States Supreme Court stated that because personal tort claims 
abated at the death of the owner, they were not assignable.72  But 
other causes of action, that survive the death of the victim, may be 
assigned.73 
Minnesota expressly addresses the assignment or transfer of an 
 
 66. See Isaac Marcushamer, Selling Your Torts: Creating a Market for Tort Claims 
and Liability, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1543, 1553 (2005). 
 67. Winn v. Ft. Worth & R.G. Ry. Co., 33 S.W. 593, 594 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896).  
The bar on assignments rule was never followed in the courts of equity as it was 
deemed unjust.  Id. 
 68. See Marcushamer, supra note 66, at 1553.  Such safeguards include causes 
of action for malicious prosecution and abuse of process, and sanctions for those 
found to be instituting or maintaining frivolous actions.  Susan Lorde Martin, 
Financing Plaintiffs’ Lawsuits: An Increasingly Popular (and Legal) Business, 33 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 57, 83–84 (2000).  In addition, lawyers are bound by 
professional rules of conduct that disallow excessive fees, and the doctrines of 
unconscionability, duress, and good faith establish standards of behavior for those 
entering into contracts for the support of litigation.  Id. 
 69. See Marcushamer, supra note 66, at 1553–54. 
 70. See Regie De L'Assurance Auto. Du Quebec v. Jensen, 399 N.W.2d 85, 89 
(Minn. 1987) (stating that an action is assignable if it meets the survivability test 
under Minnesota Statutes section 573.01 (1986)); Jandera v. Lakefield Farmers 
Union, 150 Minn. 476, 479, 185 N.W. 656, 658 (1921) (stating that Minnesota 
abrogated the common-law rule by allowing all causes of action to survive except 
those arising out of an injury to the person);  Peterson v. Brown, 457 N.W.2d 745, 
748 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (affirming that assignability of an action is governed by 
Minnesota Statutes section 573.01 (1990)). 
 71. 26 U.S. 193 (1828). 
 72. Id. at 213. 
 73. Id. (stating that claims arising out of property may be assigned). 
13
Tymchuck: Note: A Procedural Quagmire: How to Proceed with an Action in Min
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2007
14. TYMCHUCK - RC.DOC 4/10/2007  1:06:23 PM 
1200 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:3 
action by statute.74  A plaintiff who was assigned a cause of action 
may continue the action for the benefit of the assignee.75  But the 
Minnesota Supreme Court has ruled that an assignment of a cause 
of action for personal injury, and by extension a wrongful death 
action, is prohibited.76 
According to the court in Peterson v. Brown, the following 
actions are assignable: fraud and misrepresentation, claimed 
violations of a property right, negligence claims, and breach of 
contract claims.77 
E. From Wrongful Death to Survival Statutes 
Just as the wrongful death statute was a response to the general 
failure at common law to provide a remedy for wrongful death, 
there was a similar common-law failure to provide a remedy to a 
person who died before commencing or completing an action 
unrelated to the death of the party but which existed at the time of 
death.78  Historically, actions for recovery of civil damages would 
abate if the “injured” person died before commencement or 
completion of the action for which he suffered injuries.79 
States remedied this concern by enacting survival statutes 
permitting recovery by a personal representative, usually on behalf 
of the estate, for damages the decedent could have recovered had 
he lived.80  The test of survivability of the cause of action is usually 
 
 74. MINN. STAT. § 540.12 (2006) (originally enacted as Rev. St. (Terr.), c. 70,  
§ 37 (1851)).  “No action shall abate by reason of the death or disability of a party, 
or the transfer of the party’s interest, if the cause of action continues or survives.”  Id. 
(emphasis added). 
 75. Aaberg v. Minn. Commercial Men’s Ass’n, 161 Minn. 384, 385, 201 N.W. 
626, 627 (1925).  Although not addressed in this paper, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court has also ruled that a verdict for a personal injury suit is assignable.  See Kent 
v. Chapel, 67 Minn. 420, 422, 70 N.W. 2, 3 (1897). 
 76. See, e.g., Travelers Indem. Co. v. Vaccari, 310 Minn. 97, 100–01, 245 
N.W.2d 844, 846 (1976) (allowing assignment of rights to medical payments 
already made by the tortfeasor but denying assignment of an injured party’s claim 
against a tortfeasor who was under no pre-existing duty to compensate the injured 
party); see also Regie De L'Assurance Auto. Du Quebec v. Jensen 399 N.W.2d 85, 89 
(Minn. 1987) (ruling that an action can only be assigned if it survives to the 
personal representative of the deceased, which is inapplicable in a wrongful death 
case because the death creates a wrongful death action). 
 77. 457 N.W.2d 745, 749 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). 
 78. SPEISER & ROOKS, supra note 16, § 1:13. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See MINN. STAT. § 573.01 (2006). 
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the nature of the action.81 
III. MINNESOTA’S SURVIVAL STATUTE 
Minnesota law regarding survival actions has seen a gradual 
expansion in suits allowed to survive the death of a party.  The 
original survival statute provided that a cause of action arising out 
of an injury to a person died with the death of either the injured 
party or the tortfeasor, with the exception of actions for wrongful 
death.82  In 1941, the legislature amended the survival statute to 
allow causes of action growing out of personal injuries that were 
the result of the negligence of the decedent.83 
The legislature extended the survival statute in 1967 to allow 
causes of action brought in “strict liability, statutory liability or 
breach of warranty.”84  In Wild v. Rarig, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court interpreted Minnesota Statutes section 573.01 to mean that 
the survival statute was still not applicable “to intentional torts such 
as assault, battery, and false imprisonment.”85  Intentional torts 
were barred from survival under section 573.01 until 1982, when 
the court ruled that the complete bar on the survival of intentional 
torts violated the equal protection provision of the Minnesota 
Constitution.86 
A. The Minnesota Supreme Court: Complete Bar on Intentional Torts 
Under Survival Statutes Violates Due Process 
In Thompson v. Petroff, the court stated that simply because the 
Minnesota legislature intentionally excluded intentional torts from 
the survival statute did not mean it acted rationally in doing so.87  
The Thompson court stated that prohibiting the survival of 
intentional tort actions did not serve any purpose in modern tort 
law.88  The only apparent reason for the omission of intentional 
 
 81. 1 C.J.S. Abatement and Revival § 147 (2006). 
 82. 1849 Minn. Laws 403. 
 83. Lavalle v. Kaupp, 240 Minn. 360, 361–63, 61 N.W.2d 228, 229–30 (1953) 
(emphasis added). 
 84. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 573.01 (2006). 
 85. 302 Minn. 419, 446, 234 N.W.2d 775, 792–93 (1975). 
 86. Thompson v. Petroff, 319 N.W.2d 400, 407 (Minn. 1982). 
 87. Id. at 404 (stating that both Lavalle and Wild were only concerned with 
statutory interpretation and did not address the question of the act’s 
constitutionality). 
 88. Id. at 405 (citing Moyer v. Phillips, 341 A.2d 441, 443–45 (Pa. 1975), 
which held tort actions survivable because survival statutes were designed “in 
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torts from survival statutes was the “legislature’s failure to keep up 
with the development of modern tort law.”89 
As stated earlier,90 historical common-law rules regarding 
abatement of tort actions were based on the medieval concept of 
revenge.  The Minnesota Supreme Court found that these notions 
were no longer relevant in the current tort system that provides for 
compensation, rather than punishment of a tortfeasor.91  The 
majority in Thompson stated that the distinction between intentional 
torts and all other causes of action is not only irrelevant to the 
statute, but also arbitrary.92 
Based upon this analysis of the history and purpose of survival 
statutes with regard to modern theories of tort law, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court held that the survival statute failed the rational 
basis test and violated the equal protection provision of the 
Minnesota Constitution.93  The court struck the middle sentence of 
section 573.01, effectively allowing all causes of action to survive the 
death of a party except for those arising out of wrongful death.94  
The court recognized that Thompson overturned long-standing 
common-law principles, as well as current legislation, and noted 
that such endeavors should not be taken lightly.95  But the court 
stated that the current law no longer served societal needs.96  The 
new rule of Thompson was to be applied to all cases after the date of 
its decision.97 
B. The Minnesota Legislature Responds 
In 1983, the Minnesota Legislature amended the survival 
 
accordance with modern theories of tort law,” which places more stress on 
compensatory than punitive damages). 
 89. Id. 
 90. See supra Part II.A. 
 91. See Thompson, 319 N.W.2d at 405. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 406 (stating that because the court held that Minnesota Statute 
section 573.01 violated the Minnesota Constitution, it did not need to decide 
whether it violated the United States Constitution). 
 94. Id. at 407 (striking “except a cause of action arising out of bodily injuries 
or death caused by the negligence of a decedent”).  Wrongful death actions are 
governed by Minnesota Statute section 573.02.  Id. 
 95. Id. (recognizing that the effect of the decision overturned “a common-law 
rule of long standing and ancient origin” that the Minnesota Legislature adopted 
in the nineteenth century). 
 96. Id. (explaining that the rule should be replaced with one reflecting needs 
of people and demands of justice). 
 97. Id. 
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statute to conform to the court’s decision in Thompson and applied 
the rule to all causes of action arising on or after that date.98  The 
current language of the survival statute states that all causes of 
action not arising under the wrongful death statute survive to a 
personal representative.99 
As illustrated in the analysis above, wrongful death and survival 
statutes differ in theory and practice.  Wrongful death statutes 
generally create a new cause of action for the death itself and are 
for the benefit of the heirs of the person killed.100  On the other 
hand, survival statutes allow actions already commenced at the time 
of the person’s death to “survive” her death and continue for the 
benefit of the decedent’s estate.101 
IV. THE PROBLEM ILLUSTRATED: MINNESOTA PROBATE 
JURISDICTION VERSUS DISTRICT COURT JURISDICTION 
A. Deciphering Control of the Action 
In order to understand the problems that arise due to the lack 
of a clear procedure for survival actions, this Note explores the 
jurisdictional problem created when a party dies while an action is 
still pending.  As will be explained, the probate court and the 
district court have distinct spheres of jurisdiction. 
The jurisdiction of the Minnesota judiciary was set forth in the 
Minnesota Constitution.102  Specifically, the Minnesota probate 
courts have original jurisdiction for “the administration of estates 
of deceased persons.”103  The Minnesota courts are clear that, 
 
 98. MINN. STAT. § 573.01 (2006). 
 99. Id.  See also Johnson v. Taylor, 435 N.W.2d 127, 128–29 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1989) (providing another example of the Minnesota Supreme Court applying the 
revised statute). 
 100. See SPEISER & ROOKS, supra note 16, § 1:13 (citing Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. 
Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974)).  See also Martz v. Reviser, 284 Minn. 166, 169, 170 
N.W.2d 83, 85 (1969) (stating that “[t]he recovery in such an action . . . shall be 
for the exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse and next of kin, to be distributed 
to them as is personal property of persons dying intestate”); Kuhlne v. Swedlund, 
220 Minn. 573, 576, 20 N.W.2d 396, 398 (1945). 
 101. See SPEISER & ROOKS, supra note 16, § 1:13.  See also MINN. STAT. § 573.01 
(2006); Johnson, 435 N.W.2d at 128 (stating that “there is no reason why an estate 
that has been injured or depleted by [the wrong of] another should not be 
compensated whether the injured party is living or not”). 
 102. MINN. CONST. art. VI. 
 103. MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 11 (formerly MINN. CONST. art VI, § 6).  See also 
Leslie v. Minneapolis Soc. of Fine Arts, 259 N.W.2d 898, 903 (Minn. 1977) 
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according to the Minnesota Constitution and statutory enactment, 
probate courts possess exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction that is 
separate and distinct from the jurisdiction of the district courts.104  
The principal function of the probate court is to administer a 
decedent’s estate by determining who is entitled to share in such 
estate, and the court’s decree is not subject to collateral attack.105  
The probate court is granted “all powers, legal or equitable, 
essential to a complete exercise of the plenary and exclusive 
jurisdiction” provided under Minnesota Constitution article 6, 
section 11, as distinct from the general jurisdiction granted to 
district courts.106 
On the other hand, the Minnesota Constitution confers 
original jurisdiction over all civil cases to the district court.107  But 
this does not include jurisdiction over matters rightly before the 
probate court.108  In Leslie v. Minneapolis Society of Fine Arts, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court  ruled that the exclusive subject matter 
jurisdiction possessed by probate courts is “separate and distinct” 
from the jurisdiction held by the district courts.109  Probate courts 
have no jurisdiction to consider issues unrelated to the 
administration, settlement, or distribution of a decedent’s estate.110 
Therefore, probate courts have no authority to decide an action 
rightly pending before a district court, such that district court 
jurisdiction in Minnesota remains wholly separate from that 
granted probate court.111  The district courts, by statutory direction, 
only have appellate jurisdiction over matters pertaining to the 
 
(containing further explanation of the jurisdiction held by Minnesota’s probate 
courts). 
 104. Murray v. Calkins, 191 Minn. 460, 463, 254 N.W. 605, 607 (1934).  See also 
MINN. STAT. § 524.3-105 (2006). 
 105. In re Iverson, 249 Minn. 156, 160, 81 N.W.2d 701, 704 (1957). 
 106. Vesey v. Vesey, 237 Minn. 10, 10, 53 N.W.2d 809, 810 (1952). 
 107. MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 3. 
 108. See Vesey, 237 Minn. at 13, 53 N.W.2d at 812 (“Since the probate court has 
exclusive original jurisdiction to adjudicate and determine whether a person 
qualifies as an heir . . . it follows that the district court is wholly without such 
original jurisdiction and may not, by injunction or otherwise, impair or otherwise 
interfere with the probate court’s original exercise thereof.”). 
 109. 259 N.W.2d 898, 903 (Minn. 1977). 
 110. In re Iverson, 249 Minn. at 160, 81 N.W.2d at 704; Leslie v. Minneapolis 
Soc. of Fine Arts, 259 N.W.2d 898, 903 (Minn. 1977) (stating it has been 
frequently held that probate courts have no “independent jurisdiction in equity or 
at law over controversies between the representatives of the estate, or those 
claiming under it, with strangers claiming adversely, (or) of collateral actions”);  
Wilson v. Erickson, 147 Minn. 260, 261–62, 180 N.W. 93–94 (1920). 
 111. Leslie, 259 N.W.2d at 903. 
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estates of deceased persons, versus original jurisdiction, which is 
granted to the probate courts.112 
As will be illustrated and discussed later in this section, 
jurisdictcion is an issue for parties deciding how to proceed with 
survival actions that are rightly before the district court when the 
probate court is tasked with handling the decedent’s estate. 
Minnesota’s survival statute specifically states that an action 
surviving the death of a party survives to that party’s personal 
representative,113 and Minnesota law holds that probate courts have 
the exclusive power to appoint a personal representative.114  Before 
an action still pending at a party’s death may continue, Minnesota 
law dictates that a personal representative must be appointed to 
administer the estate.115  Therefore, if a client dies pending 
completion of an action already before the district court, it is up to 
the probate court to appoint a personal representative in order to 
proceed with the action.116  The district court does not have the 
jurisdiction to appoint a personal representative or to interfere 
with the probate court’s ability to administer the decedent’s 
estate.117  Therefore, parties to a survival action must deal with both 
the probate court and the district court, each with its own distinct 
jurisdiction over the matter, neither of which works in conjunction 
with the other. 
In a survival action, the district court retains exclusive 
jurisdiction over the pending action, while the probate court gains 
exclusive jurisdiction over administering the decedent’s estate.  
 
 112. Iverson, at 160, 81 N.W.2d at 704 (ruling that the district court only has 
the right to take a proper appeal after probate court has handled a case because 
the district court “has no right to make a determination, in the absence of a 
determination of the probate court”).  See also In re Hauge’s Estate, 219 Minn. 192, 
197, 17 N.W.2d 305, 307 (1945) (stating district court cannot interfere with 
constitutional jurisdiction of probate court, except by appellate or remedial 
jurisdiction). 
 113. MINN. STAT. § 573.01 (2006). 
 114. Id. § 524.3-103 (requiring personal representative to be appointed by 
order of the probate court or probate registrar and stating the administration of 
the estate is commenced by the issuance of Letters of Administration to the 
qualified personal representative).  See also Minn. Odd Fellows Home v. Pogue, 
245 Minn. 539, 73 N.W.2d 615 (1955); Wilson v. Erickson, 147 Minn. 260, 261, 180 
N.W. 93, 93 (1920). 
 115. MINN. STAT. § 524.3-601 (2006) (providing first that a personal 
representative shall qualify by filing a bond and oath of office, or a statement of 
acceptance of the duties, with the appropriate court). 
 116. Id. 
 117. See Vesey v. Vesey, 237 Minn. 10, 13–14, 53 N.W.2d 809, 812 (1952). 
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This disconnect between the jurisdiction of the probate court and 
the district court has led to a gap in the pursuit of an existing 
action that survived the party’s death.  The district court handling 
the action can order a substitution of parties.118  But the 
substitution of parties requires the appointment of a personal 
representative, which must be handled in probate court.119  
Therefore, the district court is paralyzed, and the pending action 
stalled, until the probate court takes action. 
The paralysis resulting from the separate and distinct spheres 
of jurisdiction of the probate and district courts cannot be 
overcome by agreement between the parties, as the Minnesota 
Supreme Court prohibits parties from consenting to confer control 
in excess of a court’s jurisdiction.120  As a result, the parties in a 
survival action cannot agree to submit to probate jurisdiction for 
the pending matter nor agree to allow the district court to exercise 
jurisdiction over appointing a personal representative.  The parties 
are, in effect, trapped between the “exclusive jurisdiction” of two 
courts, which can be confusing to practicing attorneys attempting 
to handle a deceased client’s action properly and expeditiously.  A 
procedure detailing the proper steps for the attorneys, parties, and 
courts to follow would alleviate this confusion and avoid the delay 
regarding the surviving action. 
B. The Court Reviews the Problem of Jurisdiction: The Case of Milner v. 
First Bank of Minneapolis 
The jurisdictional conflict between the probate and district 
courts is illustrated in Milner v. First National Bank of Minneapolis.121  
In Milner, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided whether survival 
statutes or probate statutes governed a contract action that survived 
the death of a defendant.122 
In Milner, the plaintiff commenced a breach of contract action, 
 
 118. See infra Part V.B. 
 119. See MINN. STAT. § 524.3-614 (2006). 
 120. See In re Hudson’s Guardianship, 226 Minn. 532, 539, 33 N.W.2d 848, 854 
(1948). 
 121. 228 Minn. 324, 37 N.W.2d 450 (1949). 
 122. See id. at 327, 37 N.W.2d at 450.  The court compared Minnesota Statutes 
section 525.411 (repealed and amended as Minnesota Statutes sections 524.3-803,  
-804,  -810) with Minnesota Statutes section 525.431 (repealed and amended as 
Minnesota Statutes sections 524.3-803, -804, -812), ruling that the action may 
proceed to final judgment once the court, on motion, substitutes the defendant’s 
representative as the defendant. Id. at 327, 37 N.W.2d at 451. 
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but when the defendant died before trial, First National Bank was 
appointed executor and the plaintiff moved for substitution of the 
executor of the estate in place of defendant.123  The district court 
granted the substitution and First National Bank appealed, 
asserting that under the probate statutes, the district court ceased 
to have jurisdiction when the defendant died, thus requiring the 
plaintiff to proceed with the contract action in probate court.124 
The Minnesota Supreme Court analyzed the issue using the 
language in Minnesota Statutes sections 573.01 and 540.12.125  
Section 573.01 states that all causes of action not arising out of 
personal injury survive to, and against, the personal representative 
of the decedent.126  Section 540.12 states that if an action survives 
the death of a party, it shall not abate by reason of the death of a 
party, and that where an action survives, the court, on motion, may 
substitute the representative.127  The court compared sections 
573.01 and 540.12 against section 525.43 of the probate code, 
which provides that all lawsuits where a cause of action survives may 
be prosecuted to completion—despite the death of any party—with 
the representative being substituted for the deceased party.128  The 
court stated that unless there was statutory language nullifying the 
express language of sections 571.03, 540.12, and 525.43, the cause 
of action survived to the plaintiff against the personal 
representative of the decedent.129 
The appellant attempted to counter the language in the above 
sections by asserting that, under sections 525.411 and 525.431 of 
Minnesota’s probate code, the district court’s jurisdiction over a 
contract dispute ended with the death of the defendant.130  The 
 
 123. Id. at 325, 37 N.W.2d at 450. 
 124. Id. at 325–26, 37 N.W.2d at 450.  Defendant claimed that Minnesota 
Statutes section 525.411 governed the filing of a claim against a decedent’s estate.  
Id.  Defendant also asserted that Minnesota Statutes section 525.431, which stated 
that “no action at law shall lie against a representative for the recovery of money 
upon any claim required to be filed by section 525.411” was controlling. Id. at 327, 
37 N.W.2d at 451. 
 125. Id. at 326, 37 N.W.2d at 451.  See also MINN. STAT. §§ 573.01, 540.12 
(2006). 
 126. Milner, 228 Minn. at 326, 37 N.W.2d at 451. 
 127. Id.  The court specifically stated that the plaintiff complied with the 
requirement for substitution set forth in section 540.12.  Id. 
 128. MINN. STAT. § 525.43 (1970) (repealed and amended as Minnesota 
Statutes sections 524.3-803, -806 (2006)). 
 129. Milner, 228 Minn. at 326, 37 N.W.2d at 451. 
 130. Id. at 325, 37 N.W.2d at 450.  First Bank also stated that, after the 
defendant’s death, the plaintiff should have filed the contract claim in probate 
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court ruled that sections 525.411 and 525.431 were not applicable 
to an action already pending at the time of the defendant’s 
death.131  Nothing in the language of section 525.411 or 525.431 
relates to an action already pending at the time of death, so no 
conflict existed between the statutes, because section 573.01 gave 
the plaintiff “an absolute right” to continue the action after the 
defendant died.132  The definite language of survival statutes clearly 
authorized the district court to order the substitution and any 
other interpretation would lead to “duplication and a multiplicity 
of actions.”133 
The ruling in Milner clarified that sections 573.01 and 540.12 
govern a survival action with respect to jurisdiction and the 
substitution of parties.  But it did not clarify the proper procedure 
to be followed by the parties in proceeding with such action.  Milner 
reiterated that the probate court has jurisdiction over a decedent’s 
estate while the district court maintains jurisdiction over the 
pending action.134  Milner demonstrates how the separate 
jurisdictional spheres of the district and probate courts can cause 
confusion and lead to increased litigation to settle a survival action.  
While Milner did clarify which statutes apply to survival actions, the 
appeal took place after First National was appointed as executor 
and the plaintiff had filed a motion to substitute.  What happens to 
an action after the death but before a party has been substituted?  
Parties would benefit from a procedure with clear instructions on 
how to proceed in an action pending the death of a party. 
V. PROCEDURAL ANALYSIS 
A. Procedure for Wrongful Death Claim: Minnesota Rule 144 
Minnesota courts and the legislature have clarified the 
substantive law of survival actions by stating which actions survive 
 
court because under section 525.431 she had no authority to proceed against the 
estate’s representative.  Id. at 327, 37 N.W.2d at 451. 
 131. Id. at 327, 37 N.W.2d at 451 (stating sections 525.411 and 525.423 would 
be controlling only if there was no action pending at the time of defendant’s 
death). 
 132. Id. (noting that section 525.43 makes express provision for the 
continuation of survival actions and for substituting the representative of the 
deceased). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id.  
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and in what forum they are litigated.  But the procedure for how 
these actions continue—exactly what steps should occur when a 
plaintiff or defendant dies—is incomplete.  In accordance with 
section 573.02, Minnesota established a rule of practice governing 
the procedure for commencing a wrongful death action.135  Rule 
144 of the Minnesota Rules of General Practice is derived from 
Rule 2 of the former Code of Rules for the District Courts and was 
adopted shortly after the wrongful death statute itself was made 
law.136  According to the rule, an application for the appointment of 
a trustee of a wrongful death action under section 573.02 shall be 
made by “the verified petition of the surviving spouse or one of the 
next of kin of the decedent.”137  The rule goes on to detail the 
requirements for inclusion in the petition.138  The petition required 
under Rule 144 is common enough that there is a form available 
that allows the trustee to simply fill in the blanks, provide a 
notarized signature, and file with the appropriate court.139 
In the next section, the rule states the notice and hearing 
requirements for appointing a trustee.140  The rule even goes so far 
as to state the language to be used in the caption on the petition.141  
The fourth provision explains the procedure for transferring the 
action to a different county.142  The rule also gives a detailed 
procedure for how the trustee shall handle the distribution of any 
funds recovered in the action.143 
As noted, Minnesota provides clear guidance on how to 
proceed with wrongful death actions.  A wrongful death claim 
cannot, by definition, be filed until after the death of the injured 
person, so the action is not disrupted by death in the way that a 
survival action is.  A wrongful death action already involves a party 
 
 135. See generally MINN. R. GEN. PRACTICE 144 (2006) (giving detailed 
explanation of the procedure and timeline for appointing a trustee to represent 
the next of kin of the decedent via petition). 
 136. DAVID F. HERR & LAURIE A. KINDEL, GENERAL RULES OF PRACTICE 
ANNOTATED, 3A MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES 267 (2006 ed.). 
 137. See generally MINN. R. GEN. PRACTICE. 144 (2006). 
 138. Id. at 144.01 (requiring dates and places of decedent’s birth and death, 
name, age, and addresses of decedent’s surviving spouse and next of kin). 
 139. Miller & Davis Forms, WL database MILDAV, Form No. 3281 (1998). 
 140. MINN. R. GEN. PRAC. 144.02 (2006) (stating that the petition will be heard 
upon such notice and in the manner determined by the court unless: (1) waived 
by next of kin listed on petition; or (2) court determines it is unnecessary). 
 141. Id. at 144.03 (quoting “[I]n the matter of the appointment of a trustee for 
the next of kin of ____________, Decedent”). 
 142. Id. at 144.04. 
 143. Id. at 144.05. 
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who is motivated to pursue the claim for her own benefit.144  Since 
the party pursuing a wrongful death claim will be the one who 
potentially benefits from the action, it is a reasonable assumption 
that she will keep the action moving forward.  On the other hand, 
the deceased was the “motivated party” in a survival action.  But 
after the death, a third party is now required to pursue the action 
to conclusion, even though it will benefit the deceased’s estate and 
not the third party.145  This issue is even more drastic if the 
decedent is the defendant to an action.  In this case, it is likely no 
one will be motivated to act as the personal representative to keep 
the action moving forward to conclusion.  Thus, practitioners 
handling a survival action must muddle through a confusing 
labyrinth of conflicting statutes and jurisdictional issues. 
B. General Procedure When a Party Dies Pending Action (En Pendente 
Lite) 
1. Minnesota Rule 25 
As described above, Minnesota provides no procedural 
guidance on handling an action when a party to that action dies 
before its completion.  Instead, a lawyer must rely on the rules and 
statutes that do exist to decipher how best to continue such an 
action on behalf of his client. 
Rule 17.02 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure states 
that if a party to an action is “incompetent” and has an appointed 
representative, the representative may sue or defend on behalf of 
the incompetent party.  Does the death of a client qualify as his 
being incompetent?  It is unlikely that a deceased client would be 
treated under Rule 17, because a client’s death is dealt with under 
Rule 25.  But a procedure dealing specifically with handling a 
survival action would clarify conflicts between different Rules. 
The Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure state that an action 
that survives the death of a plaintiff shall not abate, but will survive 
to the substituted representative.146  Rule 25.01 applies to the 
substitution of parties after an action has been commenced.147  But 
 
 144. MINN. STAT. § 573.02 (2006) (stating that recovery in wrongful death 
action is for “the exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse and next of kin”). 
 145. SPEISER & ROOKS, supra note 16, § 1:13. 
 146. MINN. R. CIV. P. 25.01. 
 147. See DAVID HERR & ROGER HAYDOCK, MINN. PRACTICE SERIES, CIVIL RULES 
24
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss3/1
14. TYMCHUCK - RC.DOC 4/10/2007  1:06:23 PM 
2007] WHEN A CLIENT DIES EN PENDENTE LITE 1211 
Rule 25.01 does not set forth a specific timeframe for bringing a 
motion for substitution.148  It is a generally accepted practice for 
attorneys in Minnesota to file such a motion for substitution within 
a “reasonable time” after the death of the party.149 
According to Rule 25.01, the party requesting substitution 
must serve the other parties as provided in Rule 5 and give proper 
notice of hearing in accordance with Rule 4.150  Additionally, the 
Rule does not state who may bring the motion, making it difficult 
for any party to argue prejudice by failure of the other to seek 
substitution.151 
Rule 25.01 deals with only half of the problem—the district 
court.  It does not deal with the issue of who should be appointed 
as the personal representative on behalf of the decedent.  By 
statute, this step is required before anything further can happen on 
the action once a party dies.152 The person being substituted in the 
action in district court should be the personal representative as 
appointed by the probate court.  But these actions do not happen 
simultaneously, which means that there will be a time when there is 
no party to the action in district court.  And though parties may 
expect an attorney for the deceased party to notify the court and 
opposing parties, of the death, there is no requirement for the 
lawyer to do so.153 
The death of a plaintiff is not the only issue affecting the 
 
ANNOTATED 1, at 571 (4th ed. 2006).   Rule 3.01 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil 
Procedure states that an action is commenced when the summons is served on the 
defendant or date of acknowledgement of mail service or service delivered by the 
sheriff.  MINN. R. CIV. P. 3.01. 
 148. MINN. R. CIV. P. 25.01.  Minnesota does not follow the federal rule 
requiring a motion for substitution to be made within ninety days of the 
suggestion of death.  Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 25.01). 
 149. Id.  It has been determined that courts have discretion in determining the 
definition of “reasonable” related to the substitution of a party following death.  
See generally Willoughby v. St. Paul German Ins. Co., 80 Minn. 432, 83 N.W. 377 
(1900); Hunt v. Hoerr, 78 Minn. 281, 80 N.W. 1120 (1899).  In Bisson v. Estate of 
Dean ex. rel. Eller, No. A03-2037, 2004 WL 1615219, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004), 
the defendant argued that the estate is not responsible for a claim brought against 
it because the respondent did not properly substitute the estate after the 
defendant died before the trial.  The court ruled that since Rule 25.01 of the 
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure “does not limit the time within which the 
motion to substitute must be made,” the district court properly allowed 
substitution two years after the trial ended.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 150. HERR & HAYDOCK, supra note 147, at 570. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See supra Part IV. 
 153. HERR & HAYDOCK, supra note 147, at 570. 
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survivability of an action.  What happens if the defendant to an 
action brought under section 573.01 dies?  Courts have stated that 
a cause of action does not exist in the abstract, but against 
somebody.154  Therefore, a civil action can only be commenced by 
serving a summons on the defendant.155 
In the absence of statutes to the contrary, the death of the 
defendant will abate a cause of action.156  Some jurisdictions hold 
that the death of the defendant terminates any right of recovery 
unless the statute expressly provides that such action survives.157  
Other jurisdictions claim that the statutes intend to provide 
compensation to the plaintiff regardless of whether the defendant 
survives the action.158 
The Minnesota Supreme Court has ruled that it is proper to 
make a distinction between proceedings brought against an 
individual on one hand, and those against his estate on the other.159  
By virtue of the survivorship statute, a claim against a decedent may 
be brought against the personal representative of the decedent’s 
estate.160  Once a personal representative has been appointed on 
behalf of the decedent’s estate, all proceedings to enforce the 
claim are governed by section 524.3-104 of the Minnesota 
Statutes.161 
If a party dies before the commencement or completion of an 
action, the attorney is forced to negotiate a perplexing maze of 
probate and survival statutes.  Rule 4.03 of the Minnesota Rules of 
Civil Procedure, which governs the service of process on an 
individual, is silent regarding service upon a deceased individual or 
his estate.162  If the defendant dies before the lawsuit is 
 
 154. See, e.g., Wood v. Martin, 328 N.W.2d 723, 725 (Minn. 1983). 
 155. MINN. R. CIV. P. 3.01. 
 156. See 25A C.J.S. Death § 17 (2006).  See also 1 C.J.S. Abatement and Revival       
§ 147 (stating specifically that tort actions were considered to be for the 
punishment of the wrongdoer, so that if he died, his personal representative could 
not be prosecuted for the wrong committed by the deceased). 
 157. 22A AM. JUR. 2D Death § 12 (2006). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Wood, 328 N.W.2d at 724–25 (citing Poepping v. Lindemann, 268 Minn. 
30, 35, 127 N.W.2d 512, 516 (1964)) (ruling that an action brought by a wife 
against her husband “survives” against his estate in the event of his death). 
 160. MINN. STAT. § 524.3-104 (2006) (stating an action to enforce a claim 
against a decedent’s estate, or his successors, may not be revived or commenced 
until a personal representative has been appointed). 
 161. Id. 
 162. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.01. 
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commenced, the claim generally abates.163  But according to the 
survival statute,164 an action may still be brought against the 
personal representative of the decedent’s estate.165  As previously 
explained, a personal representative is defined as someone who 
qualifies to serve as such, is appointed by the court, and accepts the 
appointment.166  Because the personal representative has the 
capacity to be sued, he becomes the proper defendant for claims 
against the decedent’s estate.167 
Minnesota law states that an action may not be revived against 
a decedent’s successors until a personal representative has been 
appointed.168  What is the procedure for commencing (thus 
serving) an action against a decedent when no personal 
representative has been appointed?  In circumstances where 
prompt action is required to guard and preserve an estate before a 
personal representative being appointed, a special administrator 
may be appointed in the interim.169  According to statute, an 
appointment may be made informally or formally.170 
If there is no urgency to the appointment, the court may, after 
notice and hearing, require a formal proceeding for appointment 
of the special administrator.171  In the event of an emergency, the 
notice requirement may be waived or altered by the court.172  But in 
order to appoint a special administrator, the court must find that it 
is “necessary to preserve the estate or secure its proper 
administration.”173 
 
 163. Zahler v. Manning, 295 N.W.2d 511, 513 n.2 (Minn. 1980). 
 164. See discussion supra Part III. 
 165. MINN. STAT. § 573.01 (2006).  See discussion supra Part III. 
 166. MINN. STAT. § 524.3-602 (2006). 
 167. Van Slooten v. Estate of Schneider-Janzen, 623 N.W.2d 269, 271 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2001) (holding that the decedent’s spouse was not properly served when 
he was not appointed as a personal representative). 
 168. MINN. STAT. § 524.3-104 (2006).  See also Van Slooten, 623 N.W.2d at 271 
(stating that an attempt to commence a personal injury action against an auto 
driver who died was ineffective as served against the deceased’s husband when no 
personal representative had been appointed). 
 169. MINN. STAT. § 524.3-614 (2006). 
 170. Id.  An informal appointment is done by filing an application with the 
Probate Registrar who then makes the appointment “when necessary to protect 
the estate of the decedent.”  Id. § 524.3-614, subdiv. 1.  Informal appointment 
must be made before the appointment of a personal representative, requires no 
notice, and grants the special administrator all the same powers to handle the 
estate as a personal representative.  Id.    § 524.3-614, subdiv. 2. 
 171. Id. § 524.3-614, subdiv. 2. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id.  The formally appointed administrator is not required to account for 
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The proper procedure is to request the probate court to 
appoint a special administrator and then to serve him with notice 
of the action.  Of course, this assumes the party bringing suit knows 
the defendant died before service. 
2. Federal Procedure 
In analyzing an issue, it is helpful to look to other jurisdictions 
for guidance.  But no other state has a procedure governing the 
interplay of the district court and probate court in survival actions.  
Therefore, this Note addresses the procedure followed by the 
federal courts as a comparison to Minnesota’s procedure for 
survival actions. 
A substitution of parties is authorized in an action in federal 
court where a party dies and the claim is not extinguished.174  The 
death must be “suggested upon the record” so that the action 
proceeds against or in favor of the surviving party.175 
The federal courts have rules governing the substitution of 
parties subsequent to a death.176  If a party dies but the claim 
survives, the court may order substitution of parties upon proper 
motion made no later than ninety days after the death is suggested 
on the record.177  Courts have been forced to decide what 
constitutes a suggestion of death which would trigger the ninety-
day period.178 
 
assets to a general administrator as is required of the informally appointed special 
administrator.  Id. 
 174. FED. R. CIV. P. 25(a)(1).  A survival action is governed by the survival 
statute of the state in which the action arose.  In re Daniel’s Estate, 208 Minn. 420, 
426, 294 N.W. 465, 468 (1940). 
 175. FED. R. CIV. P. 25. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 25(a)(1).  Until 1963, federal procedure required a substitution to be 
made within two years starting from the time of death, otherwise the action was 
dismissed as to the deceased party.  Benjamin Kaplan, Amendments to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 1961–1963 (II), 77 HARV. L. REV. 801, 806–07 (1964) 
(emphasis added).  But requiring a substitution within a specific time dating from 
the death could cause hardship to the deceased’s action.   Id.  For instance, the 
party’s death may not come to the attention of the other party or to his own 
counsel.  Id. at 807.  And the penalty of dismissal may be out of proportion to the 
offense.  Id. 
 178. Al-Jundi v. Rockefeller, 8 F.R.D. 244 (W.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding that 
suggestion of death was insufficient, as it failed to list names of executors to the 
estate); but see Yonofsky v. Wernick, 362 F. Supp. 1005, 1011 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) 
(ruling that suggestion of death was sufficient, despite failure to identify person to 
be substituted). 
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VI. ANALYSIS 
A. Jurisdictional and Procedural Issues Involving Actions Pending Under 
Minnesota’s Survival Statute 
The difference in jurisdiction between probate and district 
courts leads to a gap in adjudicating survival actions.  This occurs 
because the original action was filed in, and is governed by, the 
district court.  But administering the deceased’s estate, which 
includes the surviving lawsuit, appears to be the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the probate court.  Courts have stated that when a 
court of competent jurisdiction obtains jurisdiction of both the 
subject matter and the parties to a cause, “its authority continues 
until the matter is finally disposed of.”179  No other court is at liberty 
to interfere with such action. 
Therefore, the Minnesota Supreme Court has reiterated the 
principle that once an action is before the district court, the 
probate court cannot interfere and vice versa.180  And the court has 
ruled that the exclusive jurisdiction over the estate of the deceased 
enjoyed by the probate court is “inclusive of both settlement and 
the determination of the person to whom property passes.”181 
Due to this disparity in jurisdictions, those left behind to 
continue an action on behalf of the deceased are confronted with 
an untenable situation.  The action cannot continue in district 
court until the probate court appoints a personal representative.182  
 
 179. Shapiro v. Larson, 206 Minn. 440, 444, 289 N.W. 48, 50 (1939). 
 180. See generally Vesey v. Vesey, 237 Minn. 10, 53 N.W.2d 809 (1952).  
Since the probate court has exclusive original jurisdiction to adjudicate 
and determine whether a person qualifies as an heir, devisee, or legatee 
who may lawfully take a share of a deceased person's estate, it follows that 
the district court is wholly without such original jurisdiction and may not, 
by injunction or otherwise, impair or otherwise interfere with the probate 
court's original exercise thereof. In the settlement and distribution of the 
estates of deceased persons, the district court has only appellate 
jurisdiction, with the sole exception that it may exercise a purely ancillary 
jurisdiction to aid (but not to controvert or obstruct) the probate court in 
the performance of its proper functions in those special cases where, 
without such aid, the probate court would manifestly be unable to afford 
an adequate remedy for an alleged wrong to the estate, the heirs, 
legatees, or creditors.  
Id. at 13–14, 53 N.W.2d at 812 (emphasis added). 
 181. Id. at 13, 53 N.W.2d at 811 (citing In re Estate of Peterson, 202 Minn. 31, 
277 N.W. 529 (Minn. 1938)). 
 182. See supra Part IV for a discussion of probate and district court jurisdiction. 
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If the probate court has exclusive jurisdiction over this process, how 
does the district court learn about the death or decide how the 
action should continue?  By whom, on behalf of whom, and on 
what timeline does the action continue? 
This confusion is unique to survival actions because wrongful 
death actions are not created until the death of the injured party.  
It is the death that created the action, which means the wrongful 
death lawsuit is filed and adjudicated completely in district court.  
In addition, Rule 144 of the Minnesota Rules of General Practice 
exists to make the path of a wrongful death suit easier to discern by 
all parties involved in the action.183 
Minnesota law has adopted the federal procedure for 
substitution of parties after death, but neglected to enact any 
procedure for attorneys or courts to follow with regard to survival 
actions.  The lack of a clear procedure, and the resulting 
confusion, not only leads to further litigation but also creates a 
situation in which an attorney could be disciplined for violating the 
rules of professional conduct. 
B. Issues Related to Attorney’s Actions as Governed by the Rules of 
Professional Conduct 
The Rules of Professional Conduct, as adopted by Minnesota, 
govern the actions of attorneys practicing in this state.  Most lawyers 
practice with an eye toward following these rules while working to 
diligently resolve a matter for their clients.  But the lack of 
procedure governing the proper handling of a survival action puts 
an attorney at risk of discipline for violating the rules. 
An attorney is required to act with “reasonable diligence and 
promptness” when representing a client.184  Minnesota Rules of 
Professional Conduct, Rule 1.3, requires an attorney to pursue the 
client’s matter despite “opposition, obstruction, or personal 
inconvenience to the lawyer” and to act with commitment and zeal 
on behalf of the client.185  Rule 1.3 also requires a lawyer to carry a 
matter “through to conclusion” unless she is terminated by the 
client.186 
 
 183. See supra Part V.A. 
 184. MINN. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2005). 
 185. Id.  See also In re Anderson, 546 N.W.2d 298, 298 (Minn. 1996) (giving 
attorney public reprimand and two-year supervised probation for neglecting a 
legal matter). 
 186. MINN. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2005). 
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Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.4, states that 
a lawyer shall promptly inform the client of any circumstance 
requiring the client’s consent, consult with the client regarding 
objectives, and keep the client reasonably informed about the 
status of the matter. 187  How does an attorney comply with these 
rules if he does not have a client—or is unsure who the client is?  
The rule requires the lawyer to promptly consult with the client on 
decisions deemed to be the province of the client.188  When a lawyer 
receives a settlement offer from opposing counsel, he is required to 
promptly inform the client regarding whether to accept such 
offer.189  This is not possible if the client has died and no personal 
representative has been appointed to represent the decedent.  The 
situation is further complicated by the fact that there is no set 
timeframe in which the probate court must appoint a personal 
representative.  There is no guidance for an attorney handling a 
claim after his client dies but before a personal representative, or 
new client, has been appointed.  The attorney is caught between 
the jurisdiction of the district court, which is unable to handle 
matters related to the deceased client’s estate, including the 
lawsuit, and the probate court, which is now required to become 
involved in a matter properly before the district court by 
appointing a “new client” before the claim may proceed. 
Attorneys have reason to fear sanctions when handling survival 
actions: attorneys who have been found in violation of the 
professional rules when handling probate matters have been 
subject to discipline.190  While death of the client would most likely 
be considered a mitigating factor in a case where an attorney has 
been brought up on disciplinary charges, she would still incur the 
damage of having to defend the claim.  A specific procedure 
governing such actions would insulate her from this possibility by 
giving her a specific path to follow after her client dies. 
VII.   A PROCEDURE THAT WILL RESOLVE THE ISSUE 
A survival action is for the benefit of the estate of the 
 
 187. Id. R. 1.3. 
 188. Id. R. 1.4 cmt. 
 189. Id. 
 190. In re Ruhland, 689 N.W.2d 167, 168 (Minn. 2004) (upholding sanction 
giving attorney public reprimand and two-year probation for failing to act with 
diligence or adequately communicate with client in probate matter). 
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deceased.191  The Minnesota Supreme Court stated that there is no 
reason why an estate that has suffered an injury should not be 
compensated, whether or not the injured party survives the 
outcome of the trial.192  Since the deceased party filed the lawsuit 
and continued to pursue it until death intervened, it logically 
follows she would want to see it to conclusion.  This assumption 
calls for enacting a procedure to facilitate the continuation of the 
action until it has been satisfactorily concluded for her benefit.  The 
decedent cannot speak for herself, so it is up to her lawyer to speak 
for her and handle the matter upon her death.193  It is possible that 
only her lawyer will be aware of the deceased client’s goals with 
regard to the action, so he should be given the opportunity to 
convey those wishes to whoever is appointed personal 
representative.  An official procedure by which the action is 
continued, both in probate and district court, will allow for the 
possibility that the deceased client’s wishes with regard to the 
action will be honored. 
In order to assist practitioners in dealing with the jurisdictional 
issues between district court and probate court194 when handling a 
survival action, Minnesota should adopt the following procedure. 
The procedure would require the deceased’s attorney to file a 
“death notification” simultaneously with both the probate court 
and the district court in which the original action is being heard.195  
Further, the procedure would require the attorney to file such 
notification within ninety days of learning of the client’s death.196  
While this does place responsibility for handling the matter with 
the attorney, it is possible that he may be the only person who 
 
 191. See SPEISER & ROOKS, supra note 16, § 1:13. 
 192. See Johnson v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 420 N.W.2d 608, 612 (Minn. 
1988) 
 193. The author recognizes that some deceased parties to pending litigation 
may be acting pro se.  But a procedure assisting in such a matter is beyond the 
scope of this Note. 
 194. See discussion supra Part IV. 
 195. Under Minnesota law, while the probate court has exclusive jurisdiction in 
determining how decedents’ estates are to be administered, probate court also has 
concurrent jurisdiction of “any other action” to which an estate, “through a personal 
representative,” may be a party.  MINN. STAT. § 524.3-105 (2006) (emphasis 
added).  Therefore, it will not violate statutory law to enact a procedure requiring 
the district court and probate court to work together in handling a survival action.  
Id. 
 196. Requiring the attorney to file within ninety days of learning of his client’s 
death will avoid the issues associated with instituting a deadline, such as that 
discussed in footnote 177, commencing with the death itself. 
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knows about both the lawsuit and the death, so he should be 
entrusted with the task of at least allowing the lawsuit to proceed if 
and when a personal representative is appointed.197  Under the 
Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct, an attorney is already 
required to maintain communication with a client.198  Therefore, if 
the attorney is handling the matter properly there should not be 
too much of a delay in learning of the death. 
While Minnesota does have a policy for substituting a deceased 
party in a lawsuit, there is no procedural deadline for filing the 
substitution of party.199  The courts allow the filing to take place 
within a “reasonable time.”200  But the “reasonable time” standard is 
relatively vague and does not provide clear guidance to attorneys 
handling such matters.201  A “hard” deadline of ninety days in which 
an attorney must simultaneously notify the district and probate 
courts of the death will then trigger a timeframe in which the 
parties must file the Rule 25.01 substitution required by the 
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure.  Once the attorney files the 
notice of death, he, and the party he represents, would have sixty 
days to file a substitution of party.  Minnesota Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 25.01, requires notice to be served upon all parties 
to the action.  Therefore, under the procedure described above, 
the district court and the parties to the action are on notice that a 
party died, the court was informed of the death, and the party 
suffering the loss is dealing with the matter. 
The procedure takes the additional step of informing the 
probate court of the necessity of appointing a personal 
 
 197. The procedure should also clearly state the compensation to which an 
attorney handling such an action is entitled.  Since there is no clear “client” in a 
survival action, the attorney is at risk of being unable to collect fees for time spent 
on the matter.  The procedure shall state that the attorney is to be fairly 
compensated by the estate of the deceased until such time as a personal 
representative is appointed.  Once a personal representative is appointed, he will 
become the client and the attorney will again have a proper “party” from whom he 
may obtain proper compensation. 
 198. MINN. RULES PROF’L. CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2005). 
 199. MINN. R. CIV. P. 25.01. 
 200. Id.  See generally Willoughby v. St. Paul German Ins. Co., 80 Minn. 432, 
437, 83 N.W. 377, 379 (1900) (denying appellants’ claim that court should have 
denied substitution due to creditors’ delay in making their application for 
substitution and noting that timeframe to make application is within the court’s 
discretion). 
 201. This was demonstrated in Bisson v. Estate of Dean ex. rel. Eller, in which the 
appellate court allowed substitution two years after the trial ended.  No. A03-2037, 
2004 WL 1615219, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. July 20, 2004). 
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representative to handle the matter in the deceased’s “absence.”  
The district court, upon learning of a party’s death, shall issue an 
order to the survivors to the suit to submit a motion to the probate 
court to appoint a personal representative within thirty days of 
receiving the substitution of party notice.  Since it is entirely 
possible that the probate court will not appoint a personal 
representative within thirty days, filing a motion to have one 
appointed within the deadline will avoid the default deadline to file 
for a substitution.  A personal representative must be appointed 
before the district court will grant a motion for substitution.202  If 
the motion for substitution that is required to be filed with the 
district court under Rule 25.01 must be done within sixty days of 
filing the notice of death, the thirty-day deadline to file for the 
appointment of a personal representative is fair to allow the 
probate court to be in step with the district court. 
If the survivors to the suit cannot timely agree on a personal 
representative, the probate court has the power to appoint a special 
administrator.203  Generally, the duties of the special administrator 
are described as those of the personal representative.204  Because 
the probate court has the ability to appoint either the personal 
representative or the special administrator, the main procedural 
issue in a survival action is the separate jurisdictions of the probate 
and district courts.205 
The stalemate created when a party dies during a lawsuit is 
analogous to a claim pending when a corporation files for 
bankruptcy.  According to bankruptcy law, once a corporation files 
for protection, an automatic stay goes into effect.206  The automatic 
stay under bankruptcy law is a temporary injunction which prevents 
creditors from taking further action to recover their property.207  
The stay acts to preserve the status quo of the “deceased 
corporation” at the time bankruptcy was filed (or the “party died”) 
and is “intended to give debtors a breathing spell to put their 
 
 202. MINN. R. CIV. P. 25.01. 
 203. MINN. STAT. § 524.3-614 (2006).  Minnesota law states that the person 
named as executor in the will is to be named as the special administrator.  Id.        
§ 524.3-615. 
 204. Id. § 524.3-616 (stating that the special administrator must manage and 
preserve the assets of the estate). 
 205. See supra Part IV. 
 206. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2000). 
 207. Timothy P. Branigan & Lawrence D. Coppel, Pitfalls for the Unwary: When 
to File a Bankruptcy Case, 35-0ct. MD. B. J. 24, 26 (2002). 
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financial affairs in order.”208 
The procedure described in the beginning of this section to 
assist attorneys and parties in handling survival actions should act 
in the same manner as the automatic stay does in bankruptcy 
actions.  By preserving the status quo of a lawsuit, such a rule allows 
the parties a “breathing spell” to take stock of the lawsuit and the 
next steps to take when a party dies.  The survivors to the suit 
should be given a reasonable amount of time to assess the 
deceased’s claim and decide whether to pursue it further and 
whom to appoint as the personal representative.  It is possible that 
the heirs of the deceased knew nothing, or very little, about the 
pending claim and should be given the proper “breathing room” to 
make an informed decision on whether to pursue the action. 
But the district court should also be kept informed of the new 
situation.  Generally this is done by filing a motion to substitute 
parties.209  The motion to substitute requires a personal 
representative to be appointed as the substitute for the deceased 
party.210  Therefore, if a personal representative has not yet been 
appointed—which is highly likely, as this requires the cooperation 
of the probate court—a motion for substitution cannot be filed 
with the district court.  As previously described, the probate court 
does have the authority to appoint a special administrator to 
handle the deceased’s matters until a personal representative is 
appointed.211  This does not resolve the issue of having two courts 
with separate jurisdictions involved in the matter.  There is no 
timeframe in which the probate court must appoint the special 
administrator.212  As a result, the attorneys and parties to the action 
are still in limbo while waiting for the probate court to act.  A 
procedure that acts to immediately preserve the status quo upon 
the death of a party would alleviate the pressure felt while waiting 
for the probate court to act.  Requiring the deceased’s attorney to 
file a simultaneous motion notifying both the probate and district 
courts within ninety days of the death of the party would ensure 
that the two courts are on the same page with regard to the status 
of the lawsuit.  The probate court should then immediately appoint 
a special administrator to allow the matter to effectively be “stayed” 
 
 208. Id. 
 209. MINN. R. CIV. P. 25.01(a). 
 210. Id. 
 211. MINN. STAT. § 524.3-614 (2006). 
 212. See id. 
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until the proper personal representative is appointed. 
The Bankruptcy Code states that in order to remove the 
automatic stay, a hearing must be held within thirty days.213  This 
reduces unnecessary delay and forces the parties involved to handle 
a matter they may otherwise ignore or allow to expire.  A “dead 
corporation” most likely has no more motivation to handle a 
“lingering” claim against it than does a third party to handle a 
survival action on behalf of a dead person.214  If a party to a survival 
action wants to “remove” the court-appointed personal 
representative, it must file a motion before both the probate court 
and the district court seeking removal.  But a party should not 
simply seek the removal of the court appointed representative but 
should simultaneously file a motion to appoint a new one.  This will 
force the party to handle the matter in a quick and efficient 
manner. 
Under the Bankruptcy Code, “any willful violation of a stay 
provided by this section shall recover actual damages.”215  Sanctions 
serve as an additional method of forcing parties to deal in a proper 
manner with each other and the courts in the absence of an 
original “party.”  Similarly, Minnesota’s procedure for handling a 
survival action should include sanctions against a party who 
attempts to move the action forward without utilizing the proper 
procedure.  If a party learns of another party’s death during the 
action and attempts to improperly settle the matter (e.g., settling 
with the estate instead of the properly appointed personal 
representative), or files discovery with the district court in an 
attempt to gain an underhanded advantage, the party, and the 
attorney, should be sanctioned accordingly.  The policy for having 
a procedure governing survival actions is to assist the deceased’s 
attorney, since the client can no longer speak for himself.  
Therefore, an attempt to take advantage of the death by the 
opposing party should be dealt with through appropriate sanctions. 
This would give attorneys a clear path to follow and allow them 
to avoid possibility of violating Rules of Professional Conduct.216 
 
 213. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(B) (2000). 
 214. If the deceased is a defendant in a lawsuit, the heirs will most likely have 
even less motivation to be appointed as the personal representative to defend 
against the claim. 
 215. 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1). 
 216. See supra Part V. 
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VIII.    CONCLUSION 
The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that the legislature 
has the authority to regulate the practices of the probate court as 
long as it does not deprive the court of its constitutional 
jurisdiction.217  Therefore, it is not a violation to enact rules to 
govern the procedure of an action after a client dies.  A concrete 
procedure would give Minnesota practitioners a clear path to 
follow in working toward a beneficial conclusion for their deceased 
clients. 
The procedure outlined in this Note allows all parties involved 
to be notified in a timely manner of the death of a party.  In 
addition, it puts both the district and probate courts on notice of 
the death and of the need to substitute parties.  This allows both 
courts to ensure that the status quo of the lawsuit is preserved 
pending the appointment of the proper personal representative. 
The emergency appointment of a representative to appear on 
behalf of the deceased client prevents the matter from defaulting 
due to inaction.  And the opposing party still has the opportunity 
to settle the matter by negotiating with the personal representative 
appointed by the court, with the court having final approval of the 
settlement.  No other jurisdiction has enacted rules specific to 
handling a survival action.  Thus, Minnesota has an opportunity to 
act as a model for the rest of the country. 
 
 
 217. State ex rel. Preis v. O’Brien, 186 Minn. 432, 433, 243 N.W. 434, 435 
(1932). 
37
Tymchuck: Note: A Procedural Quagmire: How to Proceed with an Action in Min
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2007
